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I. INTRODUCTION
Until the end of the nineteenth century, most preparation for
admission to the bar in the United States had taken place outside of
the university, as it had in England.1 Prospective lawyers would
work under practicing lawyers to learn the art of lawyering.2
Preparation for legal practice involved reading in the law office and
observing lawyers in action.3 If a student of the law were unable to
* Associate Professor of Law, Barry University. B.A. (summa cum laude),
Communication and English, California State University, Stanislaus, 1999; J.D.,
University of the Pacific, 2002; M.A., Communication, University of Utah, 2003; Ph.D.,
Communication, University of Utah, 2005. The author is a member of the State Bar of
California.
For insightful feedback on prior versions of this Article, the author thanks
David J. Vergobbi of the University of Utah, Lisa Flores of the University of Colorado
at Boulder, Wayne McCormack of the University of Utah, Tarla Rai Peterson of Texas
A&M University, and Richard D. Rieke of the University of Utah. The author
presented an earlier version of this Article as part of a Communication and Law
Division panel at the 98th annual meeting of the National Communication Association
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1. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE
1850S TO THE 1980S 24 (1983); Brainerd Currie, The Materials of Law Study, 3 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 331, 342 (1951).
2. Currie, supra note 1, at 357.
3. Richard Davis Rieke, Rhetorical Theory in American Legal Practice 58 (1964)

55

56

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1

study under the supervision of a practicing attorney, the student
might read law independently.4 Acquisition of the art of rhetoric,5 if
any, came from prior education, observation of lawyers in practice, or
reading earlier works of oratory.6 This approach was very much a
hands-on approach to learning what was then the trade of lawyering.
Between 1870 and 1920, a growing group of elite lawyers
developed U.S. law into an academic field well established within the
university,7 which law remains to the present day. 8 During the same
time in U.S. history, scholars were developing the social sciences into
academic fields,9 and the university was taking root.10 As research
became more important, U.S. higher education became more
specialized.11
At Harvard Law School in 1870, Christopher Columbus Langdell
assumed the deanship and, with the support of Charles W. Eliot,
Harvard’s president, introduced the case method of instruction to his
students, moving them away from conventional legal textbooks. 12
Instead of lecturing to students, teachers who employed the case
method would ask students questions about appellate cases. 13
Langdell adopted the belief of Sir William Blackstone, the famous
eighteenth century commentator on the laws of England, that law
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University) (on file with University
Library Book Depository, Ohio State University).
4. Id.
5. The term rhetoric refers to communication, which itself refers to human symbol
use. SONJA K. FOSS & KAREN A. FOSS, INVITING TRANSFORMATION: PRESENTATIONAL
SPEAKING FOR A CHANGING WORLD 4 (2d ed. 2003). This Article focuses on rhetoric
that is persuasive in nature. See ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC
DISCOURSE 36 (George A. Kennedy trans., 1991).
6. Rieke, supra note 3, at 58.
7. John Henry Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders and the American Legal
Realists: The Professionalization of the American Law Professor, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC.
311, 314-15 (1985).
8. See Anthony Chase, The Legal Scholar As Producer, 13 NOVA L. REV. 57, 67
(1988) (noting that, because of the law school’s position within the university, the law
professor must engage in scholarship).
9. Schlegel, supra note 7, at 319.
10. LAURENCE R. VEYSEY, THE EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 1-3
(1965). In the United States, the university, a creation of Western Europe, “could
uniquely satisfy the social idealism, the personal ambition, and the prideful American
urge to equal the best of European achievements.” Id. at 3. The university grew out of
the college. Id.
11. Id. at 142-43.
12. Schlegel, supra note 7, at 314; Anthony Chase, The Birth of the Modern Law
School, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 329, 341-42 (1979). At the same time he was supporting
the introduction of the case method to Harvard Law School, Eliot was supporting
reform in the undergraduate science curriculum and the medical school curriculum.
The common objective was moving students away from lecture-based education.
Chase, supra, at 342-43.
13. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 52.
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was a science,14 an idea that had come from the civil law tradition
and had dated back at least to the Middle Ages. 15 Langdell insisted
that law students attempt to induce scientific principles of law
through careful examination of appellate cases. 16 Such a process was
supposed to bring order out of chaos.17 Under this Langdellian
paradigm, law was a system of “unitary, self-contained, value-free,
and consistent . . . principles” for students to learn.18
While the university law school began to gain control of much of
the access to the legal field, the practicing bar began to lose much of
its control of such access. Eventually, states began to disallow law
office study as a means of admission to the bar, which opened the
door to requiring law school study for admission. 19 By mid-twentieth
century, every jurisdiction would allow law school as a means of
entry into the legal field.20 Only four jurisdictions would mandate
apprenticeship, and fifteen jurisdictions would not allow
apprenticeship as a means of entry into the field. 21
At the center of the new academic legal field, recently grounded
within the university, was the law professor. Within the legal
profession, the law professor had, and continues to have, “a profound
impact on thinking about law, procedure, and institutions.” 22 Today,
because “[t]he American law professor is American legal education,” 23
14. Currie, supra note 1, at 350; Schlegel, supra note 7, at 314; STEVENS, supra
note 1, at 52. Langdell offered several observations about how law was a science. For
instance, in a speech at Harvard, he made the following statement:
My associates and myself, therefore, have constantly acted upon the view
that law is a science, and that a well-equipped university is the true place for
teaching and learning that science. Accordingly the law library has been the
object of our greatest and most constant solicitude . . . . We have also
constantly inculcated the idea that the library is the proper workshop of
professors and students alike; that it is to us all what the laboratories of the
university are to the chemists and physicists, the museum of natural history
to the zoologists, the botanical garden to the botanists.
C. C. Langdell, Teaching Law As a Science, 21 AM. L. REV. 123, 124 (1887).
15. Mathias Reimann, Nineteenth Century German Legal Science, 31 B.C. L. REV.
837, 838 n.3 (1990).
16. Schlegel, supra note 7, at 314; STEVENS, supra note 1, at 52.
17. Mathias Reimann, A Career in Itself: The German Professiorate As a Model for
American Legal Academica, in THE RECEPTION OF CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE
COMMON LAW WORLD 1820-1920 165, 178-79 (Mathias Reimann ed., 1993).
18. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 53. Langdell may have adopted this law-as-science
perspective to please Eliot, who had a science background and had taught chemistry at
Harvard. BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION:
C.C. LANGDELL, 1826-1906 app. 2 at 351 (2009); Chase, supra note 12, at 334.
19. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 217 n.9. In the late 1910s, no state required law
school attendance, but change was on the horizon. Id. at 99.
20. Id. at 217 n.9.
21. Id.
22. Id. at xiii.
23. Douglas D. McFarland, Self-Images of Law Professors: Rethinking the Schism
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he or she is “both the gatekeeper[] and molder[] of the profession.” 24
In 1927, Felix Frankfurter, then a law professor at Harvard
University and later a justice on the U.S. Supreme Court, observed,
“In the last analysis, the law is what the lawyers are. And the law
and the lawyers are what the law schools make them.” 25 Eventually,
in 1921, after the Langdellian paradigm had taken hold firmly, the
American Bar Association (ABA) recognized the law professor’s
“claim to primacy in teaching” law.26
The law professor, situated within the university, needed to have
a role, or persona, suitable for the new university paradigm. The
career practitioner who had supervised prospective lawyers under
the apprentice system would not fit. Consequently, lawyers who
supported a university-based approach to preparing prospective
lawyers for entry into the field had to devise another persona for the
law professor, and they did just that, employing discourse to develop
a scholar persona. When other lawyers disagreed with the concept of
the scholar persona, particularly regarding what it meant for the
education of future lawyers, the other lawyers responded with their
own discourse that supported a practitioner persona for the law
professor. Through rhetoric, two groups within the legal field focused
on different “values, needs, and purposes,” 27 and the controversy
became a sign of a field in transition.
This Article explains how lawyers like Langdell and James Barr
Ames, a disciple of Langdell, employed rhetoric between 1870, when
Langdell assumed the deanship at Harvard Law School, and 1920,
when law had emerged as a credible academic field in the United
States, to construct a persona, that of a scholar, appropriate for the
law professor situated within the university. To do so, the Article will
contextualize the rhetoric with historical background on the law
professor and legal education, draw upon rhetorical theory to give an
overview of persona theory and persona analysis as a means of
conducting the study, and elaborate upon both the new scholar
persona that lawyers like Langdell and Ames constructed and the
practitioner persona that other lawyers attempted to promote as the
standard. For this study, the term lawyers will refer to practicing
lawyers and judges as well as academic lawyers. Although rhetoric
cannot resolve all conflicts, the significance of the rhetoric in this
in Legal Education, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 232, 232 (1985).
24. Robert J. Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, Gatekeepers of the Profession: An
Empirical Profile of the Nation’s Law Professors, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 191, 193
(1991).
25. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992).
26. Schlegel, supra note 7, at 314, 317.
27. Paul Stob, Chisholm v. Georgia and the Question of the Judiciary in the Early
Republic, 42 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 127, 127-28 (2006).
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case is hard to overstate because the scholar persona constructed
after the Civil War and before the Jazz Age is the persona that, with
minor modifications, continues to shape law students, and thus
future lawyers, in the present day.28
II. THE LAW PROFESSOR AND LEGAL EDUCATION FROM CONTINENTAL
EUROPE TO ENGLAND TO THE UNITED STATES
The role of the law professor in the United States developed
alongside the role of the law school. Like many U.S. phenomena, this
one began in Europe. On the European continent itself before the
founding of the United States, formal university education was a
prerequisite for admission to the bar, although practical training was
another component of admission, too.29 Law teachers in Europe were
academics who wrote commentaries on the civil law in an effort “to
organize and systematize the law.”30 To the contrary, in England,
university education was not a prerequisite for admission to the bar,
although many lawyers had university educations, but
apprenticeship was a prerequisite.31 Teachers at the Inns of Court,
where future lawyers learned to practice law and which date back at
least as far as the thirteenth century,32 were legal practitioners.33
Although today in the United Kingdom an academic segment of
preparation for entry into the legal field generally takes place within
the parameters of an undergraduate education,34 this was not always
the case. The bar apparently considered the Inns sufficient.
In England, civil and canon law had been taught at Oxford and
Cambridge, but professorships in common law were relatively
unknown before the time of Sir William Blackstone.35 Beginning in a
series of lectures at Oxford in 1753, Blackstone sought to move
English legal education into academia,36 and, although the idea did
not catch on immediately, Blackstone played an important role in the
development of a new English, and ultimately U.S., connection
between legal education and the university. 37 In taking a step toward

28. See Carlo A. Pedrioli, Professor Kingsfield in Conflict: Rhetorical Constructions
of the U.S. Law Professor Persona(e), 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 701, 702, 725 (2012).
29. Currie, supra note 1, at 342.
30. Roscoe Pound, The Achievement of the American Law School, 38 DICTA 269,
269 (1961).
31. Currie, supra note 1, at 342.
32. Wilfrid Bovey, The Control Exercised by the Inns of Court over Admission to the
Bar in England, 3 AM. L. SCH. REV. 334, 334 (1913).
33. Pound, supra note 30, at 269.
34. Michael I. Swygert, Striving to Make Great Lawyers — Citizenship and Moral
Responsibility: A Jurisprudence for Law Teaching, 30 B.C. L. REV. 803, 806 n.9 (1989).
35. See Currie, supra note 1, at 346-47.
36. Id. at 347.
37. Id. at 347, 349.
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his ideal, Blackstone became, in 1758, “the first professor of English
law at any English University.”38 Unfortunately for Blackstone, his
plan for a college of law at Oxford did not materialize, and, in 1766,
the professor resigned in disappointment. 39 Nonetheless, Blackstone
set a key precedent for the university law professor within the
English common law system.
In the United States, Blackstone’s borrowed idea of a nexus
between legal study and the university slowly began to take hold.
During the final decades of the eighteenth century, four university
law professorships developed in the States, and three more such
professorships were in the planning stages. 40 For example, in 1779,
Thomas Jefferson created at William and Mary College the first
notable professorship of law in the United States, which George
Wythe assumed.41 In 1794, Columbia appointed James Kent as a
professor of law.42 In his inaugural lecture, Kent noted the following:
A lawyer in a free country, should have all the requisites of
Quintilian’s orator. He should be a person of irreproachable virtue
and goodness. He should be well read in the whole circle of the arts
and sciences. He should be fit for the administration of public
affairs, and to govern the commonwealth by his councils, establish
it by his laws, and correct it by his example.43

Kent added that the lawyer should be familiar with the Greek and
Roman classics, know something of civil law, be able to reason well
after having studied logic and mathematics, possess a good sense of
moral philosophy, and have mastered public speaking. 44 An
important point from Kent’s lecture is that to be well qualified to
serve society, lawyers ought to have broad educations, and one source
of a broad education is the university. 45
Despite the beginnings of the development of the idea of the law
professor that had come about in the United States by the end of the
eighteenth century,46 preparation for admission to the bar at that
time generally took place in the apprenticeship setting, 47 but law

38. James Bradley Thayer, The Teaching of English Law at Universities, 9 HARV.
L. REV. 169, 170 (1895).
39. Id. at 171.
40. Currie, supra note 1, at 350.
41. Id. at 350-51.
42. Robert S. Pasley, The Position of the Law School in the University, 16 CATH. U.
L. REV. 34, 37 (1966).
43. James Kent, Professor of Law, Columbia Coll., An Introductory Lecture to a
Course of Law Lectures (Nov. 17, 1794), in 3 COLUM. L. REV. 330, 338 (1903).
44. Id. at 338-40.
45. Pasley, supra note 42, at 37-38.
46. See Currie, supra note 1, at 350-51.
47. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 278-79 (1973).
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schools nonetheless began to develop. 48 For instance, in 1784, the
Connecticut-based Litchfield Law School, although not associated
with a university, opened as an extension of practical training.49
Judge Tapping Reeve was the founder.50 His school grew in size and
attracted students from across the country. 51 The Litchfield Law
School operated until 1833, ultimately having suffered from the
effects of competition.52 In 1817, two years after establishing the
inaugural Royall Professorship of Law, Harvard opened its own law
school, but the school did not survive and had to close temporarily. 53
Various factors, including high tuition and expenses, as well as
competition from both law offices and other law schools, contributed
to Harvard’s short-lived original operation of its law school. 54 Just
before it closed, the school had four students and then only one.55
In 1829, Joseph Story, who was sitting on the U.S. Supreme
Court, assumed a professorship of law at Harvard and revived that
institution’s law school in part due to his “reputation as a jurist and
success as a teacher.”56 In his inaugural address, Story, connecting
law to other fields as Blackstone and Kent had done, noted that “‘law
searches into and expounds the elements of morals and ethics, and
the eternal law of nature, illustrated and supported by the eternal
law of revelation.’”57 However, to gain new students and re-establish
the law school, Story moved the law school away from the policies of
other college programs and allowed students without college degrees
or even college eligibility to enter the law school. 58 Apparently,
pragmatics had to come before ideals because the previous shortage
of students had brought about the failure of the law school,59 and one
can assume that Story did not want that failure to recur. In his
quest to revitalize Harvard Law School, Story was successful in
attracting students from all over the country.60
Despite an early failure, the Harvard Law School became “the
first university school of law in any common law country” and, as “an
academic professional school,” stood in contrast to both “the purely

48. Id. at 279.
49. Thayer, supra note 38, at 171.
50. FRIEDMAN, supra note 47, at 279.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Pasley, supra note 42, at 38-39.
54. Currie, supra note 1, at 360.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 361, 362.
57. Id. at 362 (internal citation omitted).
58. Id. at 363.
59. See id. at 360.
60. Erwin N. Griswold, English and American Legal Education, 10 J. LEGAL EDUC.
429, 431 (1958).
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academic law schools of Continental Europe and the purely
professional legal education prevailing in England.”61 Although its
program drew upon existing legal education in Europe,62 Harvard
offered a new type of legal education that previewed the future of
legal education in the United States. 63
As noted above, by the 1870s, lawyers like Langdell were
beginning actively to develop U.S. law into an academic field within
the university.64 During this period, lawyers who supported the law
school approach to legal education faced the challenge of justifying
their nontraditional approach.65 These lawyers needed to distinguish
their product from the more traditional product of law office study. 66
Much as, during critical historical moments, U.S. legal minds had
drawn upon British common law,67 U.S. lawyers in the late
nineteenth century could draw upon Blackstone’s borrowed idea of
the nexus between legal study and the university. 68 However, lacking
contemporary models of academic lawyers in Britain, the U.S.
lawyers had to look to continental Europe, and particularly to
Germany, “the citadel of legal learning,” for contemporary models of
academic lawyers.69 These U.S. lawyers attempted to differentiate
between academic lawyers and practicing lawyers and chose to
associate the former, unlike the latter, with the university, “a
powerful symbol and an increasingly powerful institution” at the end
of the nineteenth century and the start of the twentieth century. 70
From this perspective, the law school-educated lawyer could claim
the benefit of having studied law under individuals associated with
the university.71
Langdell’s approach to developing academic law and its role
within the university was controversial but, in terms of influence and
longevity, ultimately successful. During his first year of teaching,
students came to know Langdell “as an ‘old crank,’” and the number
61. 2 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA
197 (1965).
62. See, e.g., Reimann, supra note 17, at 167.
63. CHROUST, supra note 61, at 197; Pasley, supra note 42, at 39.
64. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 52.
65. Schlegel, supra note 7, at 320.
66. Id. at 320-21.
67. See Bjørn F. Stillion Southard, Prudential Argumentation and John Marshall’s
Opinion in Marbury v. Madison (1803), 44 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 1, 16 (2007)
(noting that Marshall’s Marbury decision drew upon elements of British common law).
68. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 1, at 348.
69. Reimann, supra note 17, at 167. During the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, common law lawyers thought of German legal culture as “the
leader of the civil law tradition.” Id. at 169. In the civil law tradition, certain lawyers
had focused on scholarship and teaching since medieval times. Id. at 191.
70. Schlegel, supra note 7, at 320-21.
71. See id.
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of students in his class fell to seven or eight. 72 Also, some leading
lawyers like Oliver Wendell Holmes, who suggested in a book review
of Langdell’s casebook Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts that
the casebook editor was mad, disagreed with Langdell’s approach to
teaching law.73 Nonetheless, Langdell’s disciples like James Barr
Ames, himself a professor and later dean at Harvard Law School, 74
adopted the Langdellian approach to teaching law and helped to
spread that approach throughout the world of legal education.
Despite its many problems, such as virtually ignoring trial court
records, document-drafting skills, and witness preparation,75
Langdell’s approach to teaching law seemed like “an intellectual
Model T, a wholly complete, conceptually unified universe to put in
the mind of the standard student.”76
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, university law school
attendance became increasingly more important, 77 and the trend
toward professionalization continued. By the early 1920s, the ABA
recognized the law professor’s “claim to primacy in teaching law.”78
The law school was taking over, and the law professor was a key
actor in the drama.
Law professors, as members of the university, took to the
production of knowledge within their newly established academic
field. Traditionally, a major job of the university has been “to
advance as well as transmit ordered knowledge. This is the work for
which its society lets it live and gives it means.” 79 Accordingly, while
the law schools had the duty of training students for practice at the
bar, the law schools also had to contribute to the larger university
setting. One lasting outlet for legal research was the Harvard Law
Review, established in 1887.80 Other successful scholarly legal
journals, including the Yale Law Journal in 1891 and the Columbia
Law Review in 1901, followed.81 In 1896, the law school at the
University of Pennsylvania acquired the already-existing American

72. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 66 n.15.
73. Schlegel, supra note 7, at 322 (citing Book Notice, 14 AM. L. REV. 233 (1880)).
74. Borthwick & Schau, supra note 24, at 191; KIMBALL, supra note 18, at 339.
Ames had not practiced law, which caused controversy among Harvard Law School
faculty members when he was hired. KIMBALL, supra note 18, at 171-72.
75. Pasley, supra note 42, at 43.
76. Schlegel, supra note 7, at 323.
77. SANDRA P. EPSTEIN, LAW AT BERKELEY: THE HISTORY OF BOALT HALL 27
(1997).
78. Schlegel, supra note 7, at 317.
79. James Willard Hurst, Research Responsibilities of University Law Schools, 10
J. LEGAL EDUC. 147, 147 (1957).
80. Currie, supra note 1, at 331.
81. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 128 n.34.

64

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1

Law Register as that school’s law review.82 By 1927, forty-two law
journals were or had been in existence.83
In associating legal education with the university, lawyers who
supported the academic study of law attempted to raise standards for
law school admission and legal study. 84 The raised standards
included the requirements of some college education prior to law
school and more time spent in the study of law. 85 For example, at
Harvard Law School, students without college degrees had to pass
entrance examinations that would consist of subjects such as
Blackstone’s Commentaries and Latin or French.86 Also, the faculty
at Harvard increased the program of study from under two years to
two full years in 1871 and from two years to three years in 1876,
although then the third year did not have to be in residence. 87 By
1899, Harvard required all three years of study to be in residence.88
In contrast to offering the law office experience, university law
schools were issuing degrees. For a long time, law schools issued the
bachelor of laws degree (LL.B.), which became the traditional
standard.89 The elevated standards for university law schools
precluded many immigrants and children of immigrants from
attending law school at universities, which may have pleased the
lawyers at the law schools that sought more “respectability.” 90
The university law school was rapidly gaining a major portion of
control of access to the legal field. In 1895, James Bradley Thayer
observed that, in developing Blackstone’s borrowed notion of
university legal education, complete with law professors, the United
States “transplanted an English root, and nurtured and developed it,
while at home [in England] it was suffered to languish and die
down.”91 Thayer pointed out that “the great experiment in the
University teaching of our law at Oxford” had “furnished the
stimulus and the exemplar for our own early attempts at systematic
legal education.”92 In short, lawyers in the United States had taken
Blackstone’s borrowed idea of the university law school, which had

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Mark Bartholomew, Legal Separation: The Relationship Between the Law
School and the Central University in the Late Nineteenth Century, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC.
368, 388 (2003) (discussing how various elite law schools followed Harvard’s lead in
adopting higher standards for admission).
85. See id.
86. FRIEDMAN, supra note 47, at 530-31.
87. Id. at 531.
88. Id.
89. Jay W. Stein, The Juris Doctor, 15 J. LEGAL EDUC. 315, 315 (1963).
90. Bartholomew, supra note 84, at 388.
91. Thayer, supra note 38, at 170.
92. Id.
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come from the European continent, and run with it. After the
establishment of law professorships and law schools in the States,
lawyers developed law as an academic field, more rigorous standards
for admission to law school, and an increasingly more demanding
degree that graduates would earn. The trade was evolving into a
profession that stemmed from the university, and the law professor
had a crucial role to play in the preparation of future lawyers. With
such a connection between law and the university, lawyers needed a
persona for the law professor that was appropriate for law as an
academic field, not for law as a trade.
III. PERSONA THEORY AND PERSONA ANALYSIS93
This section of the Article addresses the theory and methodology
for the present study. More particularly, the section looks to
rhetorical theory for a discussion of persona theory and persona
analysis.
A. Persona Theory
Persona theory helps to inform the discussion of a law professor
persona suitable for law as an academic field. This theory addresses
the roles, or personae, that communicators create in discourse. 94 At
least four types of personae can be present in discourse, including the
first, second, third, and fourth personae.95 However, given the focus
of this Article on the first persona of the law professor, this
subsection will concentrate on the first persona. The second, third,
and fourth personae, which deal with audiences, will not receive
attention here.
The first persona is “the constructed speaker/writer or ‘I’ of
discourse.”96 Such a persona is “‘the created personality put forth in
the act of communicating’”97 and allows the communicator to identify
with the audience.98 In literature, the first persona is the speaker or
93. A previous version of this discussion of persona theory and persona analysis
appeared in Pedrioli, supra note 28, at 704-10. The author of that article has retained
copyright to the article.
94. Paaige K. Turner & Patricia Ryden, How George Bush Silenced Anita Hill: A
Derridian View of the Third Persona in Public Argument, 37 ARGUMENTATION &
ADVOC. 86, 88 (2000).
95. Id.; Edwin Black, The Second Persona, 56 Q. J. SPEECH 109, 112 (1970); Philip
Wander, The Third Persona: An Ideological Turn in Rhetorical Theory, 35 CENT.
STATES SPEECH J. 197, 209 (1984); Charles E. Morris, Pink Herring & the Fourth
Persona: J. Edgar Hoover’s Sex Crime Panic, 88 Q. J. SPEECH 228, 230 (2002).
96. Turner & Ryden, supra note 94, at 88.
97. Paul Newell Campbell, The Personae of Scientific Discourse, 61 Q. J. SPEECH
391, 394 (1975) (emphasis omitted) (quoting WALKER GIBSON, PERSONA: A STYLE
STUDY FOR READERS AND WRITERS xi (1969)).
98. Walter G. Kirkpatrick, Bolingbroke and the Opposition to Sir Robert Walpole:
The Role of a Fictitious Persona in Creating an Audience, 32 CENT. STATES SPEECH J.
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character a writer creates in the course of crafting writing like poetry
or fiction.99 In a way, a first persona is a mask that the
communicator chooses to wear as he or she performs rhetorically,
and because the persona at issue is a mask, the persona is not
necessarily the communicator himself or herself. 100
Critics have observed that communicators have adopted various
first personae. For instance, in 1916, Marcus Garvey, the thenunknown leader of the new Universal Negro Improvement
Association, faced the problem of leading members of an outsider
racial group against social injustice.101 In part, Garvey met the
challenge by assuming a Black Moses persona.102 Specifically, in his
rhetoric, Garvey relied upon subjects like election, captivity, and
liberation, calling to mind Moses and the Jewish experiences from
the Old Testament.103 While Garvey was not actually Moses, he did
assume the Moses persona. A more recent communicator who
adopted the Moses persona, among other personae, was Louis
Farrakhan. In his Million Man March speech, which he delivered on
October 16, 1995, in Washington, D.C., Farrakhan attempted to
enhance his credibility, or ethos, which had suffered due to
Farrakhan’s prior inflammatory racial discourse, by assuming a
prophetic persona, specifically that of Moses. 104 In a related example,
Martin Luther King, Jr., assumed in his discourse against civil rights
violations the general persona of a prophet, although despite his
skillful performance King was not necessarily an actual prophet.105
Communicators sometimes perform multidimensional first
personae. In the Gospel of St. Matthew, Christ performed a persona
that included several roles: human being, teacher, and ruler.106
Reconciliation of these competing roles within this persona came
with Christ’s resurrection near the end of St. Matthew’s account. 107
12, 12 (1981).
99. See Emory B. Elliott, Persona and Parody in Donne’s The Anniversaries, 58 Q.
J. SPEECH 48, 49 (1972); see also Campbell, supra note 97, at 391 (observing that “[t]he
term is used to mean the imaginary, the fictive being implied by and embedded in a
literary or dramatic work”).
100. See Thomas O. Sloan, The Persona As Rhetor: An Interpretation of Donne’s
Satyre III, 51 Q. J. SPEECH 14, 26 (1965) (noting that, for example, one should “not
confuse the persona with [the poet]”).
101. B. L. Ware & Wil A. Linkugel, The Rhetorical Persona: Marcus Garvey As
Black Moses, 49 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 50, 52-53 (1982).
102. Id. at 61.
103. Id. at 56-61.
104. John L. Pauley, Reshaping Public Persona and the Prophetic Ethos: Louis
Farrakhan at the Million Man March, 62 W. J. COMM. 512, 512-14, 522-23 (1998).
105. Campbell, supra note 97, at 394.
106. Craig R. Smith, The Persona of Jesus in the Gospel According to St. Matthew,
14 J. COMM. & RELIGION 57, 59-63 (1991).
107. Id. at 65.
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In his famous pamphlet Common Sense, Thomas Paine constructed a
persona complete with an inherent tension between a self-revealing
individual and an impersonal individual. 108 Paine’s persona provided
much intimate detail about a private life but revealed little
information about a public life.109 This approach allowed Paine to
assume a common individual persona, complete with the capacity to
reason but devoid of “birth, station, and office,” and to develop a
special type of charisma.110 Much more recently, in the years after
her role in the Clinton Administration’s quest for national health
care but before she announced that she would run for one of New
York’s seats in the U.S. Senate, Hillary Rodham Clinton performed a
persona that was traditionally “feminine” and family-oriented as well
as policy-oriented.111 This multidimensional persona helped to make
Rodham Clinton a more appealing, and thus viable, candidate for the
Senate seat that she ultimately won.112
The existing corpus of research on first personae has focused
predominantly on the performance of personae communicators
select.113 Although some communicators might create their own first
personae,114 many communicators employ first personae already in
existence, such as Marcus Garvey and Martin Luther King, Jr., did.
In the cases of Garvey and King, respectively, the chosen personae
were Moses specifically and a prophet more generally.115 Because the
scholarly interest has tended to be what communicators do with the
assumed personae, scholars often have ignored much or all of the
process of the creation of rhetorical personae.
Along this line, scholars who have focused on performance of
first personae have not explored in depth situations in which
communicators create in their discourse first personae for future use.
While in certain cases the two concepts of construction and
performance of first personae can function together, distinguishing
108. J. Michael Hogan & Glen Williams, Republican Charisma and the American
Revolution: The Textual Persona of Thomas Paine’s Common Sense, 86 Q. J. SPEECH 1,
13 (2000).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Karrin Vasby Anderson, Hillary Rodham Clinton As “Madonna”: The Role of
Metaphor and Oxymoron in Image Restoration, 25 WOMEN’S STUD. COMM. 1, 19 (2002).
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Ware & Linkugel, supra note 101, at 56-61; Campbell, supra note 97,
at 394; Pauley, supra note 104, at 522-23; Phyllis M. Japp, Esther or Isaiah?: The
Abolitionist-Feminist Rhetoric of Angelina Grimké, 71 Q. J. SPEECH 335, 337, 339-43
(1985); Smith, supra note 106, at 59-63; Laura Severin, Becoming and Unbecoming:
Stevie Smith As Performer, 18 TEXT & PERFORMANCE Q. 22, 32 (1998); Anderson, supra
note 111, at 19; and Nneka Ifeoma Ofulue, President Clinton and the White House
Prayer Breakfast, 25 J. COMM. & RELIGION 49, 56-61 (2002).
114. Kirkpatrick, supra note 98, at 22.
115. Ware & Linkugel, supra note 101, at 61; Campbell, supra note 97, at 394.
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between two major types of first personae is necessary. On one hand,
a communicator can select and assume a persona in his or her
communication. This process is one of performance, so this type of
persona is a first persona performed (FPP). On the other hand, a
communicator might create a persona, which the communicator
himself or herself or a different communicator might employ in
subsequent discourse. This process is one of construction of a
discursive tool for later implementation, so this type of first persona
is a first persona constructed (FPC).
B. Persona Analysis
Some scholars have labeled the methodology for doing a persona
theory study persona analysis.116 At least two types of persona
analysis are possible. One type of analysis is first persona performed
(FPP), which considers roles that communicators perform in
discourse, while the other type of analysis is first persona constructed
(FPC), which considers the rhetorical construction of roles that
communicators can perform in the future. Although FPP has been
the traditional approach taken in rhetorical studies, FPC, which this
Article seeks to develop, is more appropriate for this study because
the present study focuses on creation, not performance, of roles.
The present FPC study involves identification of the various
traits of the law professor for which, between 1870 and 1920, lawyers
argued in their writings and organization of such traits into
categories of personae. For instance, such traits include participating
in full-time teaching and research, as well as having extensive
practical experience in lawyering. These traits may be more scholarly
or more pragmatic in nature. When considered together, the
particular characteristics within artifacts offer an outline of the law
professor persona that communicators have put forth. Unlike an FPP
analysis, an FPC analysis may not give the critic the opportunity to
rely upon various precedents for the study of the persona because the
persona is often new.
Research for this Article did not locate any examples of FPC
studies. As noted above, critics have focused their energies on
studying the FPP. Nonetheless, rhetorical personae have to come
from somewhere, so at some point in time their construction must
have taken place. Accordingly, FPC studies are appropriate, and this
Article offers such a study.
The texts for this current research come from a search of
HeinOnline. This electronic database contains law review articles
that date back to the nineteenth century. For example, the database
contains the first issue of the American Law Register, which debuted
in 1852 and later became the University of Pennsylvania Law
116. Smith, supra note 106, at 64; Turner & Ryden, supra note 94, at 90.
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Review.117 Although HeinOnline does not necessarily contain all law
reviews, the database does contain hundreds of law reviews,
including law reviews at some of the most influential law schools. A
critical advantage of the database is that, unlike databases such as
Westlaw and LexisNexis, HeinOnline contains numerous articles
from the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, which
is essential for a study focused on the era from 1870 to 1920. Hence,
because it dates back so far, HeinOnline proved to be an appropriate
database for this particular study.
The search in HeinOnline identified any law review article that
contained the terms law and professor in the title. Many such
articles, although not all, would be likely to address the subject of
this current study, but these articles would not necessarily provide a
comprehensive listing of relevant articles since the discourse may
have appeared in articles that did not focus exclusively on the law
professor. To increase the number of appropriate articles identified,
the search included locating relevant articles cited in the footnotes of
the articles that resulted from the HeinOnline search. Accordingly,
while the texts located for this study are by no means all of those
relevant to the topic, they are both broad in their historical origins
and not necessarily limited to articles that focused exclusively on the
law professor.
IV. THE LAW PROFESSOR PERSONA—SCHOLAR V. PRACTITIONER
Applying persona theory to the texts identified for the study, this
section of the Article examines the two main personae that lawyers
put forth in their rhetoric between 1870 and 1920. The discussion
focuses on the persona of the law professor as scholar and the
persona of the law professor as practitioner. 118
A. The Law Professor As Scholar
As noted above, by the end of the nineteenth century, the
university law school was rapidly gaining control of a major portion
of access to the legal field. Beginning in the 1870s, various key
players at Harvard Law School and other elite law schools
energetically began to promote a new persona for the law professor.

117. 1 AM. L. REG. (1852); STEVENS, supra note 1, at 128 n.34.
118. The idea of the persona of the law professor as a scholar/practitioner hybrid
also emerged in the rhetoric, but this hybrid concept did not play a major part in
shaping the rhetoric. For the hybrid perspectives of two lawyers, compare Albert M.
Kales, Discussion, The Ultimate Function of the Teacher of Law, 3 AM. L. SCH. REV. 9
(1911), and Albert M. Kales, Should the Law Teacher Practice Law?, 25 HARV. L. REV.
253 (1912), with Harlan F. Stone, The Function of the American University Law
School, 3 AM. L. SCH. REV. 11 (1911), and Harlan F. Stone, The Importance of Actual
Experience at the Bar As a Preparation for Teaching Law, 3 AM. L. SCH. REV. 205
(1912).
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James Barr Ames of Harvard maintained in 1900 that the law
professorship would be “a new career in the legal profession.” 119
William R. Vance, professor at Yale Law School, referred to this
persona as that which “the new class of lawyers just emerging into
group consciousness” would adopt.120 As is possible with personae,121
this law professor persona involved multiple dimensions, including
(1) an almost exclusive professional commitment, (2) teaching duties,
(3) the production of research, and (4) a public function. The ensuing
discussion examines the arguments that fleshed out this persona.
First, pro-scholar advocates argued that the law professor should
devote almost all professional time to the university. 122 Ames
commented that “[t]he work of a law professor is strenuous enough to
tax the energies of the most vigorous and demands an undivided
allegiance.”123 To support his vision for this dimension of the law
professor persona, Ames observed that at various law schools like
those of Harvard, Columbia, Virginia, Washington and Lee, Cornell,
and Stanford, a professional devotion had become the norm for law
professors.124 Vance agreed with Ames.125 Noting that law belonged
in the university setting and adding that a “studious faculty” should
guide the study of law, James Bradley Thayer offered essentially the
same position on this point that the law professor should devote a
career to the university.126 Professors should “give, substantially,
their whole time and strength to the work,” Thayer urged.127
In advancing this argument and also in part refuting the claim
that opponents of the scholar model made regarding the need for
practical experience, another Thayer, Ezra Ripley Thayer of
Harvard, explained what might happen if a law professor had
substantial duties outside of the university.128 If a law professor had
to practice law, the uncertainties of legal practice, especially the
timing of trials, could conflict with the law professor’s teaching. 129
119. James Barr Ames, The Vocation of the Law Professor, 48 AM. L. REG. 129, 136
(1900). Having studied law in Germany in 1869 and 1870, Ames was familiar with
Germany’s well-established model of the academic lawyer. Reimann, supra note 17, at
173-74. Ames greatly respected the German tradition of academic law and brought
home some of its ideas. Id. at 174-75.
120. William R. Vance, The Ultimate Function of the Teacher of Law, 3 AM. L. SCH.
REV. 2, 7 (1911).
121. Smith, supra note 106, at 59-63.
122. Ames, supra note 119, at 137.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Vance, supra note 120, at 4.
126. Thayer, supra note 38, at 173.
127. Id. at 183.
128. Ezra Ripley Thayer, Note, Should the Law Teacher Practice Law?, 25 HARV. L.
REV. 269, 269 (1912).
129. Id.
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Indeed, “the impossibility of combining a trial practice with proper
teaching” was a problem.130 Ezra Ripley Thayer suggested that if the
number of treatises law professors had produced had declined by the
early 1910s, the decline was due to the lack of time for production of
such research.131 In short, law professors were not to spend much
time, if any, in the practice of law; rather, the university deserved
their almost undivided attention.
Second, advocates of the scholar persona argued that the law
professor persona should include a teaching dimension.132 The law
professor who had mastered an area of the law had to find ways to
teach that area of law to law students. 133 Ames endorsed the
Langdellian inductive method of legal studies, by which students
would ascertain legal principles from cases and discern where the
law on a given matter stood.134 The professor would lead classroom
discussion on a subject, and ideally the discussion would continue
outside of the classroom so that the students would have vigorously
engaged the course materials. 135 H. B. Hutchins of the University of
Michigan also noted the importance of teaching as one dimension in
the law professor persona,136 as did Felix Frankfurter of Harvard. 137
Suggesting that the law professor had to place “before his students
and make[ ] beautiful to their eyes those great principles of right and
justice that either do underlie, or should underlie, all of our rules of
law,” Vance went so far as to compare a law professor’s teaching in
the classroom to the teaching of Christ in the New Testament. 138
On this note, professors had to devote a substantial amount of
time to teaching.139 James Bradley Thayer observed, “[W]hen the
work is fitly performed, [it] calls for an amount of time, thought and
attention bestowed on the personal side of a man’s relation to his
students which instructors now can seldom give.” 140 Ezra Ripley
Thayer added, “The mere preparation for [the law professor’s] classroom work will itself be a large matter.” 141 From this perspective, the

130. Id.
131. Id. at 272-73.
132. Ames, supra note 119, at 138.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 139.
135. Id. at 140.
136. H. B. Hutchins, The Law Teacher: His Functions and Responsibilities, 8
COLUM. L. REV. 362, 371 (1908).
137. See Felix Frankfurter, The Law and the Law Schools, 1 A.B.A. J. 532, 539
(1915) (stating that law professors contribute to the field not only by creating treatises,
but also through “their class-room work”).
138. Vance, supra note 120, at 7-8.
139. Thayer, supra note 38, at 183.
140. Id.
141. Thayer, supra note 128, at 271.
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law professor would need to spend time considering how to make
sense out of what the professor’s own law professors had taught the
professor.142 Once the law professor had formulated a personal
understanding of the law, the professor would discuss that
understanding with students not only in class but also outside of
class.143
While some experience with legal practice might be helpful, such
experience was not the main, or even a key, feature behind the
teaching dimension of the law professor persona. 144 Indeed, the
practitioner was the law professor of the past. Under the old regime,
the law professor might have been someone who was “a lawyer in full
practice and a teacher only as his professional engagements [would]
permit” or perhaps “a judge upon the bench and a teacher
incidentally.”145 However, the law professor of the present was “a
lawyer withdrawn from practice and its emoluments” 146 who had
learned law “by scholarly research.” 147 Langdell argued the following
about the new law professor, in part refuting the claim that
opponents of the scholar persona made about the need for practical
experience:
What qualifies a person . . . to teach law, is not experience in the
work of a lawyer’s office, not experience in dealing with men, not
experience in the trial or argument of causes, not experience, in
short, in using law, but experience in learning law, not the
experience of the Roman advocate, or of the Roman praetor, still
less of the Roman procurator, but the experience of the Roman
jurisconsult.148

Indeed, for Langdell and the lawyers who supported his position, a
law professor was one who was more familiar with the path of
studying law than the path of practicing law. As unorthodox as this
view was in the United States at the time, the new law professor
persona was not oriented toward having a dimension of legal
practice.149
Third, advocates of the scholar persona argued that the law
professor persona also should have a research dimension. 150 Calling
upon the European tradition of legal education, Ames asserted that
in Germany “we find a large body of legal literature, of a high
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See Hutchins, supra note 136, at 368.
145. Id. at 362.
146. Vance, supra note 120, at 5.
147. Dudley O. McGovney, Discussion, The Function of the American University
Law School, 3 AM. L. SCH. REV. 17, 19 (1911).
148. Langdell, supra note 14, at 124.
149. McGovney, supra note 147, at 18.
150. See Ames, supra note 119, at 141.
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quality, the best and the greater part of which is the work of
professors.”151 Identifying several law professors as “the lights of the
legal profession in Germany,” Ames noted, “The influence of their
opinions in the courts is as great or even greater than that of judicial
precedents.”152 Ames lamented his perception that the legal
literature of the United States lagged behind that of Europe, and he
desired that law professors in the United States begin to develop
“treatises on all the important branches of the law, exhibiting the
historical development of the subject and containing sound
conclusions based upon scientific analysis.” 153 The advantage of the
treatises was that the judge, who was not an expert in all areas of
the law, would “have the benefit of the conclusions of specialists or
professors.”154
Other lawyers besides Ames argued for the importance of the
production of research as a dimension of the law professor persona.
For instance, James Bradley Thayer justified the research dimension
of the law professor persona by claiming that law professors had
“much formidable labor [to do] in exploring the history and
chronological development of our law in all its parts.” 155 Also,
Hutchins viewed scholarship as “[a] first requisite of effective law
teaching,”156 a requisite that would inform one’s teaching. By the
term scholarship, Hutchins did not mean “the scholarship of the
practitioner who investigates from time to time parts of subjects to
meet immediate professional demands”; instead, Hutchins referred to
“the scholarship that comes from scientific and systematic study in a
rather limited field of our jurisprudence.”157 An important point here
was that the law professor’s research would point out “not only what
the law within a given field has been and is, but also what it should
be.”158 Vance cited examples of research on the law such as John
Henry Wigmore’s work in the area of evidence and John Chipman
Gray’s work on the rule against perpetuities. 159 Hutchins maintained
that the ideal law professor persona of the future would be a persona
free from distractions from “the field of research and legal
authorship.”160
Such research that was an important part of the new law
professor persona would be specialized in nature. The law professor,
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 141-42.
Id. at 143.
Thayer, supra note 38, at 183.
Hutchins, supra note 136, at 368.
Id.
Id. at 370.
Vance, supra note 120, at 8.
See Hutchins, supra note 136, at 371.
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Hutchins argued, should not have “to become a master of half a
dozen disconnected subjects in the law and to speak and write in
regard to them with authority.”161 Rather, the law professor was to
become an expert in one, two, or perhaps three areas of the law and
to publish in these areas.162 Accordingly, the law professor with one
or more specialties might produce “treatises of the highest class.” 163
Fourth, and on a note related to research, pro-scholar lawyers
argued that the law professor persona should include a public
function dimension.164 This public function could play out in several
ways. For instance, as suggested above, the law professor could
conduct research that would benefit the judiciary. 165 Also, the law
professor’s research could provide criticism of new legislation. 166
Further, the law professor might participate in the drafting of new
legislation, perhaps joining judges and practicing lawyers in the
preparation of such legislation. 167 One example of this might be the
re-drafting of criminal statutes.168
Beyond these tasks, such a public function included advancing
the standards for admission to study law.169 These standards might
include an increased number of years of preparation for the study of
law. Noting, in 1908, that four years of high school were the general
requirement for law school admission, Hutchins predicted that more
schools would adopt the requirement of a year of college work, which
some law schools already required, and that, in the future, multiple
years of college work could become the prerequisite for law school
admission.170 Regardless of the particulars, the law professor would
be the one to work on standards, especially because the law professor
was aware of the needs of the students who were already studying
law.171
From a pragmatic perspective, Frankfurter explained why the
law professor persona should include a public function dimension.
Frankfurter noted that unlike the members of the judiciary and the
practicing bar, who were “overworked,” law professors, who were
“free . . . from the absorption of practice,” could turn their time to
developing the law.172 Operating under the law-as-science paradigm,
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 368.
Id. at 369.
Thayer, supra note 128, at 270.
Hutchins, supra note 136, at 371.
See Ames, supra note 119, at 141.
See id. at 145.
See id.
Vance, supra note 120, at 8.
Hutchins, supra note 136, at 371.
Id. at 372.
Id.
Frankfurter, supra note 137, at 537-38.
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Frankfurter suggested that law professors might develop legal
hypotheses that practicing lawyers and judges would test. 173
Frankfurter used Joseph Story’s work on developing a restatement of
the English common law as an example to further this particular
point.174 In this manner, Frankfurter refuted the pro-practitioners’
call for the law professor to practice and teach simultaneously.
As just laid out, the scholar version of the law professor persona
included four major dimensions for which lawyers offered support: an
almost exclusive professional commitment, teaching duties, the
production of research, and a public function. Although this persona
consisted of several dimensions, these dimensions came together to
form one unified scholar persona. In the United States, then, this
was the new professor-as-scholar persona that lawyers at Harvard
and various other elite law schools constructed and disseminated
through their rhetoric.
B. The Law Professor As Practitioner
Commentary has observed that “law is a dualistic, adversarial
system.”175 While lawyers like Langdell and Ames were attempting to
construct the law professor persona as scholarly in nature, other
lawyers were trying to resist such rhetoric by presenting the law
professor persona as more practical in nature. This latter
understanding of the law professor was more traditional in the
United States than the understanding of lawyers like Langdell and
Ames, but, in light of the pro-scholars’ spirited advocacy, the latter
position required vigorous advancement. In presenting their ideal
persona, pro-practitioner lawyers argued (1) that law was a practical
subject that called for practical training and (2) that only an
individual with practical background was well-suited for assuming
the law professor persona. The ensuing discussion examines the
arguments that fleshed out this persona.
First, as noted, lawyers who supported the practitioner persona
for the law professor argued that law was a practical subject that
called for practical training. For example, Paul L. Martin, dean of the
Creighton University Law School, argued that a lawyer’s academic
training alone was insufficient because it would “fail to fit the law
graduate for that immediate service which he aspires to render.”176
Instead, “a sufficient training in practice” was vital.177 Relying upon
an analogy with medical education, Martin pointed out that medical

173. Id. at 538.
174. Id.
175. Catherine L. Langford, Appealing to the Brooding Spirit of the Law: Good and
Evil in Landmark Judicial Dissents, 44 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 119, 119 (2008).
176. Paul L. Martin, Practical Legal Education, 3 AM. L. SCH. REV. 237, 237 (1913).
177. Id.
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students would spend the majority of their last two years of medical
school in hospitals and clinics in which the students would “learn to
apply practically what they ha[d] gleaned from the books.”178 Martin
extended the significance of this analogy by noting that dental,
pharmacy, and engineering students also had practical components
to their respective educations. 179 Claiming that law schools could
give law students “more than mere theory,” Philip T. Van Zile, dean
of the Detroit College of Law, agreed that law students should gain
substantial practical experience.180 Van Zile maintained that law
schools could not pay too much attention to the teaching of legal
practice because the idea was to give law students as much
experience as possible, not only in the realm of litigation, but also in
other branches of practice.181
David Werner Amram of the University of Pennsylvania, who
concurred with the positions of lawyers like Martin and Van Zile,
further argued for the importance of practical subjects. 182 To help
justify more practical work in U.S. law schools, Amram cited the
experiences of the legal fields in other countries. 183 For instance, law
graduates in Germany had three years of apprenticeship before
practicing law, including one year in public administration, one and
one-half years in lower court practice, and one-half year in higher
court practice.184 Law graduates in Canada had to spend several
years as clerks in solicitors’ offices.185 While the German and
Canadian systems were not perfect, the U.S. system comparatively
lagged behind in preparing lawyers to practice.186 Amram proposed
that the following practical subjects appear in the curricula at U.S.
law schools: practice and procedure, preparation of litigation papers,
inspection of courts, preparation of non-contentious papers, law office
management, use of the law library, and brief preparation. 187
Thinking that students would learn trial practice more effectively in
actual courts, Amram left that area off his list of recommended
practical subjects.188
While lawyers were the principal participants in this conflict,

178. Id. at 238.
179. Id.
180. Philip T. Van Zile, Practice Work in the Law Colleges, 2 AM. L. SCH. REV. 71, 73
(1907).
181. Id. at 74.
182. David Werner Amram, Law School Instruction in Practice, 3 AM. L. SCH. REV.
439, 439-41 (1914).
183. Id. at 440-41.
184. Id. at 440.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 440-41.
187. Id. at 441-44.
188. Id. at 446-49.
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they were not the only participants. For example, Walter K. Towers,
a law student at the University of Michigan, joined the cause for the
practitioner model.189 Towers conveyed the story of a colleague “who
finished a year’s study of the law with excellent marks, yet did not
know what ‘34 Michigan, 254,’ meant.” 190 Towers pointed out that
because law students often entered a new and unfamiliar world when
they commenced studying law, one should refrain from assuming
“that the ordinary law student has, or can secure for himself, any
practical details that are not taught as part of or involved in the
regular school work.”191
Second, as the above rhetoric would suggest, individuals who
adopted this practice-oriented position argued that only an individual
with practical background was well-suited for assuming the law
professor persona. J. Newton Fiero, dean of the Albany Law School,
argued that only the practitioner had “a true perspective” on the
various topics at law school and that the practitioner’s illustrations
from actual practice would impress the student. 192 As Van Zile noted,
law professors “should be something more than school teachers.” 193
Instead, law professors ought to be the following:
[M]en who have had practice in the profession, in the law office,
and in the courts; men of experience in all the work of the
profession, as well as men of learning, who are able to teach the
law and apply it, who are not confined to books alone, but who can
draw from the wellsprings of legal lore gathered from an actual and
successful practice.194

The law professor, then, was a legal practitioner.
Pro-practitioner lawyers argued that a law professor who
assumed a scholar persona was not well equipped for the job.
Refuting the rhetoric of the advocates of the scholar model, Fiero
argued that a law professor who took up the persona of a scholar
without practical experience was very much like an individual who
took up the persona of an engineer and then attempted to offer an
explanation “of the functions and possibilities of a steam engine,
without instruction as to the method of its operation.” 195 Fiero
extended the analogy in this way:
It would scarcely be deemed wise to place in charge of a passenger
train a locomotive engineer whose knowledge of his engine was
189. See Walter K. Towers, A Student’s Opinion of Practical Law School Instruction,
2 AM. L. SCH. REV. 556, 556 (1911).
190. Id. at 557.
191. Id. at 556.
192. J. Newton Fiero, Teaching Law Without Experience at the Bar, 3 AM. L. SCH.
REV. 558, 559 (1914).
193. Van Zile, supra note 180, at 74.
194. Id.
195. Fiero, supra note 192, at 559.
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derived solely from books explaining its construction, and who had
no instruction as to which lever should be used in going ahead, and
which one for stopping or backing his train.196

In short, lack of practical experience at the bar was a serious
handicap for law professors.197
In advancing his position, Fiero responded to the pro-scholar
position of Langdell, Ames, and others. Fiero maintained that his
rhetorical opponents had “overlooked the fact that there were able
lawyers in the days before law schools, when the only place for study
was in the office of the practicing lawyer.” 198 By calling on a more
traditional approach to learning law, Fiero attempted to deny the
need for the new Harvard approach.
Thus, despite the rhetoric designed to construct the law
professor persona as one of a scholar, vigorous opposing rhetoric
appeared in an effort to present the law professor persona differently.
Some lawyers simply did not accept the scholar persona and made
their case for the practitioner persona, arguing that law was a
practical subject that called for practical training and that only an
individual with practical background was well-suited for assuming
the law professor persona.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1921, the ABA’s Section of Legal Education and Admissions to
the Bar recommended, and the ABA then accepted, that every
candidate for bar admission should have graduated from a law school
that had the following standards: two years of college as a
prerequisite, three years for full-time law study or longer for parttime law study, an adequate library available for law students, and a
large enough number of faculty members who would devote their full
attention to the law school.199 The ABA’s focus on academic
standards made it clear that the scholar model of the law professor
had prevailed.200 Indeed, for at least the previous two decades, the
scholar model of the law professor had been spreading from Harvard
to other major universities.201
The rhetoric regarding the law professor persona was one aspect
of the larger conflict between 1870 and 1920 over whether law was a
profession, frequently described at the time as a type of science, 202 or
196. Id.
197. Id. at 560.
198. Id. at 559.
199. A.B.A., Conference on Legal Education, 7 A.B.A. J., 637, 637-38 (1921).
200. See Schlegel, supra note 7, at 317.
201. See KIMBALL, supra note 18, at 192.
202. See Langdell, supra note 14, at 124. Since the Harvard lawyers and their allies
viewed law as a science, which was professional in nature, the law professor persona
they constructed would need to be some sort of a professional. See H. S. Richards,
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a trade. In a report for 1913, the Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching noted that the issue of whether law was
then a profession or a trade was very much alive.203 While engaged in
this conflict, the legal field lagged behind other fields in
professionalizing. For example, in medicine at that time, a physician
would earn a doctor of medicine degree (M.D.), which would provide
evidence of medical training.204 In law, however, an attorney would
not necessarily even earn a bachelor of laws degree (LL.B.), the
degree of the day; often passing a bar examination was the only
requirement.205 The credentials were not the same.
Rhetoric provided one way to improve the status of the legal
field, and so Langdell, Ames, and their allies argued for a professoras-scholar model that met the standards of university membership.
In addition to the dimension of full-time devotion to the job, such a
persona included teaching, research, and service dimensions. 206 At
that time in the United States, higher education, in drawing
inspiration from contemporary European universities, was moving
away from the idea of the liberal arts college and toward the idea of
the university.207 Consequently, the pro-scholar lawyers developed a
persona suitable for the university, which was the gateway to
professional status for the legal field. Indeed, Langdell, Ames, and
their allies even successfully predicted the future because the scholar
model of the law professor continues to prosper in the U.S. university
of the present day.208 As in fields throughout the university, the
current full-time model in law includes “teaching, writing, and
service.”209
At a theoretical level, this discussion of how lawyers like
Langdell and Ames employed rhetoric between 1870 and 1920 to
construct a persona appropriate for the law professor situated within
the university has illustrated the benefits of addressing the first
persona from a slightly different angle. While prior communication
research had focused on the performance of a pre-existing first
persona like that of a prophet, the current study has illustrated in
detail how communicators can fill volumes in the act of rhetorically
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constructing a new persona. This distinction is one between the first
persona performed (FPP) and the first persona constructed (FPC).
The theoretical distinction allows critics to focus more on either the
performance or the construction of first personae, although
performance and construction are not mutually exclusive. For
instance, once lawyers have constructed a law professor persona,
conforming law faculty members would perform some version of that
persona. A focus on the FPC would be useful in studying rhetoric in
areas outside of legal education, including legal practice and politics.
In 1900, Ames declared, “I have the faith to believe that at no
distant day there will be at each of the leading university law
schools, a body of law professors of distinguished ability, of national
and international influence.”210 The professors would be “men
teaching in the grand manner, and adding lustre by their writings to
the University and to the legal profession.” 211 Eventually, Ames
would get his way. As the university law school began to gain control
of a major portion of access to the legal field, the law professor would
assume the persona of a scholar and ultimately become the
gatekeeper to the profession.212 No longer would the law professor be
someone with a trade.
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